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INTRODUCTION
The Association amended its CC&R's by a method created whole
cloth by the trustees.

Appellee would have us believe that the

Association's trustees invented the written balloting process in
order to allow for more participation by the property owners.
Nothing could be further from the truth.

The trustees had

attempted for years, unsuccessfully, to amend the CC&R's in
face-to-face meetings of members of the Association.

Having been

defeated at every turn, the trustees created a method by which
they controlled the flow of information, they created the rules
and procedures for voting and tallying votes, and they controlled
the outcome.

The procedures they employed were contrary to the

Association's charter documents and the provisions of the extant
CC&R's.
In pursuit of their goal, the trustees violated all of the
fundamental rules of shareholder voting.

There was no notice

given to all members, there was no record of those entitled to
vote, there was no record date set or membership list produced,
deadlines for voting established by the trustees were ignored and
extended without notice, and the explicit rules in the
Associations' bylaws regarding tallying of votes were ignored.
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Appellee indicates in paragraph 4 of its Statement of

Facts that the "bylaws do not specifically require that all
voting be done at a meeting."
face-to-face meetings.

The bylaws only contemplate

Sections 2.5 (voting requirements,

casting votes, proxies), 2.6 (record date establishment), 2.7
(quorum, reconvened meetings), and 2.8 (irregularities) of the
bylaws, only make sense in the context of a face-to-face meeting.
Likewise, requirements of record dates, membership lists
available at the time of voting, and determination of those
entitled to vote, all require a face-to-face meeting and a
definitive voting date.
2.

Without the requirement of a meeting, fundamental

rights of members can be ignored, which is precisely what was
done in the present case.

No record date was set.

R. 749-752.

No membership list was prepared or maintained at any time.

2

R.

750-753.

Voting deadlines were set and ignored.

Voting was

extended arbitrarily for more than one year because the trustees
were unable to muster sufficient votes to amend the CC&R's.
51,53,54,356.
ignored.
3.

R.

In tallying votes, specific voting procedures were

R. 33,512.
Contrary to the implication from Appellee's Statement

of Facts, paragraph 4, while the Bylaws allow for reconvened
meetings of shareholders, no meeting of shareholders of the
Association prior to the filing of the present action was ever
reconvened.
4.

In reply to Appellee's Statement of Facts, paragraph 5,

the trustees were never properly elected by vote of the
shareholders of the Association, since no reconvened meeting was
ever held, and yet the trustees acted and transacted business
without authority.
5.

Contrary to Appellee's assertions in its Statement of

Facts, paragraphs 7 through 11, the Association's attorney
recommended the written ballot mechanism not as an attempt to
allow more participation by property owners, but in order to
comply with the Association's CC&R's which clearly required that
a majority of the members approve amendments.
6.

R. 245.

Appellee's Statement of Facts, paragraph 13, indicates

that the notice to members "requested" that ballots be returned
no later than November 30, 1994.

In fact, both the notice to

members and the letter from counsel for the Association clearly

3

indicated that the deadline for voting was November 30, 1994.
The notice stated the ballot was "(to be returned by November 30,
1994)."

R. 53.

Mr. Welling's letter was even more explicit:

"Please note: the voting period expires November 30, 1994;
ballots must be returned by that date." (emphasis in original).
7.

The trustees have expressed through their actions, time

and time again, that they do not want the input of the property
owners.

Attempts to amend the CC&R's failed year after year, yet

the trustees ignored the wishes of the property owners who
participated and continued to scheme to amend them.
8.

No one discussed the use of a reconvened meeting in

connection with amending the CC&R's in 1994 since the
Association's counsel had already informed the Board that use of
a reconvened meeting was not an option.
9.

Contrary to Appellee's Statement of Facts, paragraphs

14 and 15, and no matter how often Appellee asserts that the
notice of the balloting to amend the CC&R's was hand delivered to
each of the members of Highland Estates, the record is clear that
the notice was not hand delivered and that all homeowners did not
receive the notice and the ballot1.

R. 473.

No less that the

past-President of the Association, Michael Ferrigno, testified
that he "did not vote in 1994 when the Highland Estates

1

Note how carefully Appellee couches its statements in paragraphs
14 and 15 -- "the Amended CC&R's was to be hand delivered," and
"Plaintiffs received by hand delivery." It, too, recognizes that
not all members were hand delivered (or even delivered at all)
the notice, ballot and amended CC&R's.
4

Properties Owners Association proposed to amend the CC&R's for
the subdivision because I did not receive any notice of the
vote/7 and "I did not receive any letters soliciting my vote, did
not receive copies of the proposed amendments to the CC&R's, nor
was I given a ballot with which to cast my vote/'
10.

R. 473.

Paragraph 17 of Appellee's Statement of Facts notes

that the January, 1995 Association newsletter extended the voting
period for the measure.

Appellee fails to note that the

newsletter was sent months after the deadline for voting had
already passed, the extension period for voting was never put to
the vote of the members nor approved by the members, and there is
nothing in the record to suggest that the newsletter was properly
delivered to all members.
11.

Paragraph 18 of Appellee's Statement of Facts is simply

wrong and ignores the explicit wording of the notice and cover
letter, the only documents the trustees supposedly went to great
pains to deliver to all members.

The deadline of November 30,

1994, was highlighted, and the exact words chosen and used by the
Association's counsel were:

"the voting period expires November

30, 1994."
12.

Paragraph 20 of Appellee's Statement of Facts fails to

note that the amended CC&R's as recorded varied substantially
from the CC&R's submitted to the members for their approval.
provision dealing with liability of members for bridal path
improvements, a key provision according the trustees in their

5

A

description of the amended CC&R's, was completely omitted from
the CC&R's as recorded.

Thirteen lots were excluded from the

definition of residential lots in the recorded CC&R's versus the
CC&R's submitted for approval.
13.

R. 756-767, 768-779.

The trial court, in ruling on Appellee's Motion for

Summary Judgment, held that Appellants were proper parties to
bring a derivative action on behalf of the Association, that they
properly represented other members of the Association similarly
situated, and that the action was properly brought as a
derivative action, in the right of all the other shareholders of
the Association.
14.

R. 654,655.

Contrary to the assertions of paragraph 33 of

Appellee's Statement of Facts, plaintiff Rebecca LeVanger did not
"wrongfully" secure the voting ballots and did not "circumvent"
discovery procedures.

She was given access to the ballots by the

President of the Association upon request.

There was nothing

surreptitious about it2.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Did Not Properly View the Evidence.

The trial court failed to consider the cumulative effect
that all of the procedural irregularities had on the voting
process undertaken by the Association's trustees rendering the
vote fatally defective.
2

The trustees voted to impeach Mr. Ferrigno as President and
later asked Ms. LeVanger to request his resignation while he lay
dying of cancer, in retaliation. They are now attempting to
unseat Ms. LeVanger in retaliation for the lawsuit.
6

The Association failed to establish the propriety of the
notice given to members.

On its face, the Affidavit of Mr.

Welling does not contain information regarding hand delivery of
the notices.

Yet the trial court accepted the unsupported

representation of counsel for the Association.
The deadline for voting was explicitly set forth and later
extended (long after the deadline had passed) until sufficient
votes could be obtained to achieve the result the trustees
desired.

Even in circumstances in which mail-in balloting is

allowed, there is must be a reasonable length of time to conduct
the election.

More than one year passed, 41 lots changed hands

in the interim, the whole purpose of the balloting had to be lost
on most voters by the end of the unreasonably lengthy balloting
process.
Establishing a record date is fundamental to any voting
process, defining eligibility to vote and identifying those
entitled to vote.

A record date was not established.

Votes were tallied behind closed doors, not at a
face-to-face meeting.

The voting irregularities were numerous

and render the result voidable by the trial court.
Appellee argues that the actions of the trustees are
protected by the business judgment rule.

One of the very cases

cited by Appellee, In re Croton River Club, Inc., 52 F.3d 41 (2d.
Cir. 1995), questioned the applicability of the business judgment
rule in the homeowner association context, citing the primary

7

case relied on by Appellee, Levandusky v. One Fifth Avenue
Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317 (N.Y. 1990).

The court noted:

Levandusky emphasized that the business judgment rule
was to be looked to for purposes of analogy only and
that the rule would have to be adapted in light of the
somewhat different context of boards of not-for-profit
cooperative condominiums. Levandusky,
553 N.E.2d
at
1321-22.
It is the case with regard to such boards
that members will be condominium owners and will rarely
be wholly disinterested.
The trustees acted in their own self-interest and in bad
faith in forcing the amended CC&R's on the Association's members
and their actions should not be shielded by the business judgment
rule.
II.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion

The evidence sought to be introduced in connection with the
motion to reconsider were the ballot results, proving the
invalidity of the vote tally made, and the Affidavits of two home
owners who came forward late in the process to offer their
testimony on important matters of notice of the balloting process
and sufficiency of the disclosure in the notice.
Counsel for plaintiffs did not waive plaintiffs rights to
contest the trial court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to
reconsider.

Counsel agreed to go forward with oral argument,

noting for the record that the pleadings had not been reviewed.
The trial court indicated that it would consider whether it was
necessary to review the pleadings.

Following oral argument the

trial court noted that its decision was based solely on
procedural grounds and that it, therefore, had no need to review
8

the pleadings.

Counsel for plaintiffs did not stipulate that the

trial court's decision not to review the pleadings was correct or
that plaintiffs would not appeal the trial court's decision on
the matter.
As for the notion that counsel "agreed to submit/'
Appellee's argument is incredible.

When the trial court,

following argument, says "are you ready to submit" or "will you
submit," it doesn't mean "if you say yes you are agreeing with
everything I am doing here today!"
arguing."

It means, "are you done

And plaintiffs' counsel was.

Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App.
1994), still provides the standard that should be applied in
considering whether the trial court's decision was arbitrary and
capricious:
when (1) the matter is presented in a "different light"
or under "different circumstances;" (2) there has been
a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new
evidence; (4) "manifest injustice" will result if the
court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court
needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an issue was
inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the
court.
Id. at 1311 (citations omitted).
The trial court abused its discretion and its ruling should
be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred and its decisions should be
overturned.
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DATED:

November 19, 1999.
ROBINSON & SHEEN, L.L.C.

ASU
Attorneys for the LeVangers
Appellants
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